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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEJ\fENT OF TilE. CASES
The within appeals are taken by the plaintiffs from
·'
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adYerse judgments render~d in favor of the defendants
by the District Court of Piute County, Utah, Hon. John
L. SeYy, Jr., Judge.
These t\YO cases have been consolidated for the purpose of this brief. They "\vere, under stipulation, and by
order of the trial court, consolidated for the purpose of
trial; and by stipulation of the parties,, through their re~pectiYe counsel, the Bill of Exceptions settled by the trial
court is to be considered on appeal as the Bill of Exceptions in each of the cases.
Aside from the differences i.n parties defendant and
property involYed, the pleadings and issues in each of the
cases are the same, the facts and the points of law involved are practically identical.
Plaintiffs brought suit against the defendants in 'replevin to repossess person~l property, claiming to_ be
the owners thereof. Defendants answered claiming ownership of the property. The trial court held with th~ defendants and entered judgments accordingly. The within
appeals are taken by the plaintiffs from such adverse
judgments which refused plaintiffs any relief and awarded possession of the property to the de~endants.
Respecting the case in 'vhich l\felvin Blake is named
as defendant, plaintiff brought suit to recover the posses-sion of one 573 gallon liquid gas storage tank of the value
of $300.00, or for the value thereof in case a delivery
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could not be had.

The complaint is in the usual form,

alleging that at the time of the commencement of the
action and for some time prior thereto the plaintiffs were
/

entitled to the immediate possession of such personal
property;· that the defendant came into the possession
thereof from one Ervin C. Lay who obtained possession
from the plaintiffs, and that the defendants were then in
the possession thereof; that plaintiffs demanded possession from· the defendant who refused to give up possession; and that the defendant wilfully and wrongfully
retains and withholds possession from the plaintiffs. The
complaint alleges a damage for the withholding of the
property; but plaintiffs elected at the trial not to press
the claim for such damages and therefore made no proof
thereof. (Case No. 7360, Abs. R. 1-3). The answer denies
that plaintiffs were the owners of the_ gas storag·e tank
and alleges that the defendant is the owner thereof. The
answer a.dmits that the defendant came into possession
of the property through Ervin C. Lay and alleges that
defendant is now in possession, that he is the owner of
the tank and that he is entitled to the possession thereof.
The answer denies any demand for possession of the
property but alleges if such demand had been made the
defendant would have refused to surrender the possession to plaintiffs or anyone else. (Case No. 7360, Abs.
R. 8-9).
Respecting the case 1n which Morris Johnson and
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Loraine Johnson are the defendants, plaintiffs brought
suit to recover the possession of one 320 gallon liquid gas
storage tank of the value of $200.00, or for the value
thereof in case a delivery could not be had. The complaint
alleg·es that the defendants "'rere during all of the times
therein stated, co-partners, and inn all other respects the
allegations are similar to those in the Blake case. (Case
No. 7361, Abs. R. 1-3). The answer admits the co-partnership of the defendants and in all other respects it is similar to the admissions and denials set forth. in the Blake
case. (Case No. 7361, Abs. R. 8-9).
On the above pleadings the cases proceeded to trial.
On stipulation of the parties the court ordered the cases
consolidated for purpose of trial. (Trans. 3 and 4).
Some months after trial the court rendered its decision
in each case finding ·for the defendants and against the
plaintiffs, whereupon findings of fact and conclusions of
law were entered and a decree entered accordingly in
each case.
In the Blake case, No. 7360, the court found that the
defendant was the owner of and entitled to the possession
of the storage tank; that payment had been made therefor, and that the possession of the defendant was rightful
and valid. It will be observed that the court did not find
that the plaintiffs had llllt been paid for the tank, nor do
the findings show 'vhen or where payment was made and
by or to "'"hom. In fact, the court made no findings what-
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·ever as to how the plaintiffs, stipulated to have been the
owners of the tank, lost their title. The court concluded
the defendant was the owner of and entitled to the undisturbed possession of the property and a decree was entered accordingly. (Abs. R. 12-13).
In the Johnson case, No. 7361, the court found that
the defendants were co-partners doing business under the
firm natpe and style of Horseshoe Cafe; that the defendants are the· owners and entitled to the possession of the
storage tank, that payment had bee:p. fully arid completely
made for the property and that the possession was rightful and valid in the defendants. It will be observed that
in this case also the court did not find that the defendants
made payment for the tank to the plaintiffs, nor do the
findings show when or where payment was made or to
_whom, nor how the plaintiffs, stipulated to have been the
owners, lost their title. The court concluded the defendants were the owners and entitled to the undisturbed possession of the property and a decree was entered accordingly. (Abs. R._14).
STATE~IENT

OF THE FACTS

The plaintiffs are co-partners in a business operated
at Cedar City, Utah, known as LaFrentz Liquid Gas Company. This company serves itome and business houses
with liquified gas for cooking, heating and refrigeration.
In the operation of such business the plaintiffs furnish
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rc·rtain equipment consisting of tanks, regulators, fittings,
pipes, etc. \'Then the liquified gas contained in the tanks
!s exhausted the· tanks are refilled with a new supply.
(Trans. 5-6).
Tanks, rylinders and other equipment used for stor-age of liquified gas were leased by the plaintiffs to their
~ealers on a lease rental basis, while gas burning appliances such as stoves, heating panels, re~rigerators and
the like were sold outright to their dealers. ( Tr. 34_ and
Ex. 1).
The plaintiffs did not sell directly to consumers, but
ga \Te franchises to dealers, under the terms of which the
plaintiffs, as distributors, leased tanks and appurtenant
equipment needed and used for the storing and keeping
of liquid gas used in gas burning appliances, but sold to
the dealer gas burning appliances and the liquid gas for
refilling storage tanks, which the dealer in turn sold to
his customers who ·were the consumers. (Ex. 1).
At the commencement of the trial and before any
evidence "\Vas taken it was stipulated that the plaintiffs
"Nere the owners of the tanks in question prior to the delivery of the property to Mr. Ervin C. Lay, a dealer, who
in turn delivered possession of the tanks to the defendants ( Tr. 4-5). There was no issue, therefore, concerning the plaintiffs' ownership of the property up to the
time they turned the possession over to the dealer Lay~
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"rho in turn delivered possession to the defendants. In
other words, the defendants claim their title through Lay
and/or the plaintiffs and not through any other person
•

or persons.

On December 7th, 1946, a franchise agreement was
prepared and signed by the plaintiffs as a distributor,
and ]1Jrvin C. Lay, as a dealer, (Ex. 1). Lay did business
t.ht~n under the name of "The Legas Company" and re-sided at Circelville. Under the terms of the franchise
LRy was appointed as a dealer for the plaintiffs in handling, selling and dealing in liquid gas and/ or gas burning equipment. The dealer agreed he would not purchase
from anyone excepting the distributor any liquid gas
and/or gas burning equipment which he might sell directly or indirectly in the territory allotted to him. Paragraph 3 of the franchise specifically provides as follows:
I

3. Deale~ agrees to lease from distributor all
tanks and appurtenant equipment. which shall be
needed and used by him for the storing and keeping
of liquid gas which shall be stored or kept on hand
for sale by the dealer during the life of this agreement. (Italics ours).

Other pertinent provisions of the franchise are as
follow:
7. This agreement does not constitute dealer as
agent or legal representative for distributor for
any purpose whatsoever. Dealer is not granted any
express or implied right or authority to assume or
create any obligation or responsibility in behalf of
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distributor or to bind distributor in any manner or
thing whatever.
5. Dealer agrees to maintain a place of business satisfactory to distributor for use in storing
and displaying gas burning equipment and merchandise 'vhich he shall purchase through distributor
for resale.
·
After the franchise agreement was executed the
tanks in question " . . ere delivered to Mr. Lay, and thereafter the tanks were installed at the defendants' respective places of business. (Tr. 8~9-15-16). Defendants were
customers of the dealer Lay.
The distributor, not the dealer, was to serv1ce the
leased storage tanks and equipment, the servicing to con~ist of plantiff's trucks going to each place and refilling
the tanks, and keeping the tanks in good repair, painting
the signs, etc .. ( Tr. 12). Distributor painted the Johnson
tank, checked the pressure line and placed a sign on the
tank 'vhich stated ''This tank shall not be filled by anyone
other than the LaFrentz Liquid Gas Company." (Tr. 13lD).

About June 23, 1947, the dealer elected, under its
terms, to terminate the franchise. (Ex. 3). After receiving the notice of termination and after the cancellation
date of the franchise the distributor did not service the
tanks because defendant Johnson commenced purchasing
gas -from Ervin Lay, then operating independent of the
p~aintiffs and under the name of ''Southern Utah Gas
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(~ompany.''

Plaintiffs, however, stood ready, able and
""'illing to continue such servicing and offered to do so.
Defendants refused to accept the service. ·( Tr. 12-16-17,
Exs. 4-5-7).
Concerning the arrangement under which the storage tanks· and appurtenant equipment was leased (not
sold) to the dealer, plaintiffs as distributors not only relied on the franchise agreement, but submitted to and procured from the defen¢lants a "rritten statement or agree- ment s·etting ~orth the conditions unde-r which these tanks
"\Vere delivered and would be operated. Loraine Johnson,
one of the partners in the b-o.siness known as Horseshoe
Cafe, signed the agreement (Ex. 2), which proyided:
THIS AGREEMENT, dated the ........ day of
June, 1947, between LaFrentz Liquid Gas Company,
party of the first part, hereinafter called ''Company,'' and Morris Johnson, party of the second
part, hereinafter called '' Buy~r,' '-Witnesseth:
1. Purchase of LaFrentz Lagas : Buyer shall
purchase from Company all liquified petroleum gas
used by buyer on buyer's premises locate.·d at Circleville, Utah. The product sold hereunder shall be
LaFrentz Legas in compa1~.y's cylinders delivered
on buyer's order in company's customary manner.
* * * *
II. Rental of set: Buyer rents from Company
one 320 gal. Cylinder No. D8922 LaFrentz Legas
Dispensing Set and regulator complete with fittings
delivered and assembled on said premises by Company, and buyer agrees to pay a labor and installation charge of $250.00 and a rental of $ n·one per
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year for each and every year of this contract after
the first year hereof. Such rental to be due and payable in advance on each anniversary hereof. All
property hereby rented shall at all times remain the
property of and under control of company. _~uyer
shall install and maintain the piping from the set
to appliances at buyer's expense. Company shall
have access to the set at all reasonable times and
will remedy any mechanical defects in the set upon
notice from buyer unless the set has been tampered
'vith by buyer or other unauthorized person. Title
to the set shall rerr/;ain in comp_any. The set shall
not be moved from its o!iginal location except by
company. If buyer should abandon the set, or upon
any other breach by buyer of the provisions hereof,
Company may remove the set forthwith and retain
all rentals pre1Jio~tsly paid as liquidated damages.
* * * (Under general provisions on reverse side of
contract: If the set or cylinders, or any other prnperty covered by this agreement becomes lost or damaged beyond further effective use or if said property or any part thereof ·is not returned to company promptl.y upon any termination of this agreement, buyer shall forthwith pay company the current market value of the particular article or articles involved. .(Italics ours).
The tank was received by the Johnsons on June 16,
1947 (Tr. 47), and the agreement was signed on June 17th,
1947, as shown by Exhibit 2.
Robinson, one of the then partners in the R. & B.
Cafe, signed a similar agreement (Ex. 6; Tr. 17 and 40).
The defendant Blake testified that he received the
tank now in his possession either in February or March

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

of 1947, and that he paid $350.00 to the Richfield Commercial Bank for it, (Tr. 36). Payment was made to the
account of the dealer Lay because Lay had borrowed some
money from the Richfield bank. Blake also testified he
had never seen Exhibit 6 w~ich was the·lease agreement
signd by Robinson. At the time Robinson signed the
agreement he. and Blake were partners operating the R.
& B. Cafe.
The defendant Johnson testified that he received the.
320 gallon tank from Mr. Lay about July, 1947; that it
was h_is understanding he bought the tank from Lay; that
he bought about $1100.00 worth of equipment from Lay
including the tank; that he knew nothing about the leasing ag:reement his wife had signed, and although ·his wife
told him she had signed it, he did not think it was worth
anything and paid no attention to it. (Tr. 40 to 49).
Ervin Lay testified that he signed the franchise
agreement in J?ecember, 1946, and that it was signed on
the 9th or 19th (Tr. 53). On cross-examination he testified it" was signed on the 9th, the day that property was
first b~lled to him (Tr. 65-66). Exhibit 8 shows that a
number of small 100 'lb. cylinders complete with regulators, etc., were billed on Dec. 9th, 1946 (Tr. 65-66), and on
the invoice was written the following: ''The 100 lb. cylinders remain the property of the LaFrentz Liquid Gas
Company who ar~e the distributors for the dealer known
as the LaGas Company, located at Circleville, Utah.
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(Signed) Ervin C. Lay- F. H. LaFrentz." Lay admitted
that after signing the franchise he had no different arrangement with the plaintiffs concerning their business
relations and the way equipment would be billed or
charged to him than at the time the franchise was signed;
that the first invoice of material billed to him was ·the
cylinders (Exhibit 8); that there was no different arrangement in acquiring possession and taking over the
500 gallon and 320 gallon tanks than the arrangement
concerning the cylinders (all being storage receptacles for
holding of liquid gas and to be refilled when empty);
that whatever the deal wa.s concerning the 100 pound cylinders would be the same deal and arrangement concern·
ing the larger tanks which were to be installed for customers use- and to be refilled ( Tr. 66-67).
The 320 gallon tank which went to J ohnsons, according to exhibit "A" was billed to Lay on June lOth, 1947,
long after the franchise agreement was signed, and the
agreement, (Exhibit 2), signed by Loraine JohRson is
dated in ,June, 1947. The 500 gallon tank which went to
Blake was billed to Lay on Feb. 7, 1947, several months
after the franchise was signed, and the agreement, (Exhibit 6) signed by Robinson and Blake is dated Dec. 1946,
but was actually signed a couple of months later, (Tr.
30-32). Exhibit "A" shows that two 320 gallon tanks
were billed to Lay at $300.00 or $150.00 each, and Exhibit
"B" shows that the 500 gallon tank was billed at $250.00.
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Exhibit 2 shows that the 320 gallon tank complete with fittings was delivered to Johnson for a labor and installation
or rental charge of $250.00, and Exhibit 6 shows that the
500 gallon tank, complete with fittings, was delivered to
R. & B. ·cafe for a labor and installation or rental charge
of $350.00. No further rental could be charged to the
customer who was entitled to keep the tank and fittings
for at least five years so long as the custo.mer complied
with the terms of the agreement (see last clause on reverse side of these agreemnts). The difference or ad.vance charge of $100.00 on each tank represented the dealer's profit _for handling, ~or his labor in making the instal··
lations, and hauling the equipment from Cedar City, etc.
When plaintiffs sent Lay a statement, it carried items
which were charged for appliances being sold outright to
Lay, and for cylinders and tanks (which plaintiffs contend 'vere being leased), the i terns being intermingled in
invoices and state:ments. When a check was given by
Lay to plaintiffs and marked ''payment on account'' or
-"paid," it might include payment for the appliances as
well as charges made for tanks and cylinders that were to
be installed for the use of customers and to be refilled
when empty. (Tr. 63-64).
Evelyn D. LaFrentz testified that she is the secretary
and bookkeeper for the LaFrentz Company and that she
makes out the invoices and sales slips, (Tr. 72); that in
the handling of her office work, she used identical ·sales
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slips· to record any transactions, which is done for the
records in the offire because· the slips are numeriGally
numbered; that the billing of tanks and cylinders and
equipment used for storage purposes were handled by the
use of the same kind of printed tickets as merchandise
that was being sold outright. (Tr. 73-74).
After the defendants refused to permit the plaintiffs to refill the storage tanks with liquid gas or otherwise use the distributors' products, and after the defendants refused to accept the· service of plaintiffs, but commenced doing business with Ervin Lay who was th~n
operating independent of the plaintiffs, these plaintiffs
brought the within actions to repossess their storage tanks
and appurtenant equipment, and the defendants, contending that they purchased these tanks from Lay and are the
o'vners thereof, have resisted such action.

ASSIG NJ\tiENTS OF ERRO:&
The plaintiffs and appellants herein assign the follo,ving errors committed by the trial court upon which
they rely for a reversal of the judgment appealed from
and for ari order of this court directing the trial court
to enter a judgment as prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint.
Concerning Case No. 7360 in which Melvin Blake
is defendant :

'

1. The trial court erred in making its finding No. 2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
· (Abs. 12). While denominated as a finding, the statement that the defendant is the owner and entitled to possession of the tank, is a conclusion of law. Even though
finding No. 2 be accepted as a finding, it is without support in the evidence and is contrary to the evidence in
that plaintiffs' exhibits 1 and 6 show the tank to be leased
property and not sold either to Ervin Lay or the defendant Blake.
·2. The trial court erred in making its finding No. 3
(Abs 12). That such finding is without support in the
evidence and is contrary to the evidence in that plaintiff's
exhibits 1 and 6 show that the property in such finding
described was leased and not sold either to Ervin Lay or
the defendant Blake.
3. The trial court erred ·in making that portion of
its finding No. 3 ''and that possession is rightful and
valid." While such statement is denominated as a finding, it is a conclusion of law."
4. The trial court erred in failing to make any finding showing when payment for said tank was made, to.
whom, amount paid, or any circumstances showing whether payment was made as the purchase price of the tank
or for _a rental thereof.
5. That the trial court erred in making its conclu-·
sion of law N o._l, (Abs. 13).. That such conclusion is
without support in the evidence and is contrary to the law
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applicable to the facts as shown by the evidence. That
such conclusion is not supported by any finding o ffact.
6. That the trial court erred in making its conclusion
of la"" No. 2, (Abs. 13). That such conclusion is without
support in the evidence and is contrary to the law applicable to the facts as shown by the evidence. That such conclusion is not supported by any finding of fact.
7. That the trial court erred in making and entering
its decree in favor of defendant and against the plaintiffs (Abs. 14). That such decree is without support in
the evidence and is without support of any finding or
findings, and is contrary to law.
8. That the trial court erred in not making ·and entering its decree in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant as prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint.
Concerning Case No. 7361 in which Morris Johnson
and Loraine Johnson are defendants:

.

1. The trial court erred in making its finding No. 2
(Abs. 12). While denominated as a finding, the statement that the defendant is the owner and entitled to possession of the tank, is a conclusion of law. Even though
finding No. 2 be accepted as a finding, it is without support in the evidence and is contrary to the evidence in
that plaintiffs' exhibits 1 and 6 show the tank to be· leased
property and not sold either to Ervin Lay or the defendants Johnson.
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2. The trial court erred in making its finding No. 3
(Abs 13. That such finding is without support in the
evidence and is contrary to the evidence in that plaintiffs'
exhibits 1 and 6 show that the property in such finding
.
described was leased and not sold either to Ervin Lay or
the defendants Johnson.
~

3. The trial court erred in making that portion of its
finding No. 3 "and that possession is rightful and valid."
While such statement is denominated as a finding, it is a
conclusion of law.
4. The trial court erred in· failing to make any finding sho"\\ring when payment for said tank was made, to
whom, amount paid, or. any· circumstances showing whether payment was made as the purchase price of the tank
or for a rental thereof.
5. That the trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law No. 1, (Abs. 13). That such conclusion is without
support in the evidence and is contrary to the law applicable to the facts as shown by the evidence. That such
conclusion is not supported by any finding of f'act.
6. That the trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law No. 2, (Abs. 13). That such conclusion is without
support in the evidence and is contrary to the law applicable to the facts as shown by the evidence. That such
conclusion is not supported by any finding of fact.
7. That the trial court erred in making and entering
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its decree in fnYor of defendants and against, the plaintiffs. (Abs. 14). That such decree is without support in
the evidence and is without support of any finding or
findings, and is contrary to law.
8. That the trial court erred in not making and entering its recree in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants as prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint.
ARGUMENT

I.
The conclusions of law and the decrees are not supported by any findings of fact.
We haYe set forth only eight assignments of error in
each of the two cases at bar. Four of these assignments
pertain to the findings of fact of the trial court, and four
attack the conclusions of law and the decrees.

It is the contention -of the appellants that there is no
sufficient finding to support the conclusions of law or the
decrees. By the decrees the defendants are declared to
be the owners and entitled to possession of the disputed
storage tanks with fittings. The conclusions of law set
forth that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any right or
interest in the property and that the defendants are the
o"\\rners and entitled to the possession thereof. The court
made only three findings. The first recites that plaintiffs
are co-partners doing business as I.jaFrentz Liquid Gas
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Company; that the defendants Johnson were co-partners
doing business as Horseshoe Safe. (In the Blake case
the court found that Blake was doing business as the R.
& B. Cafe).
The second finding :reads as follows :
"The court finds that the defendants are the
owners and entitled to the possession of the following described property: 320 gallon liquid gas storage tank No. D8922, complete with fittings and regulator, being of the value of $200.00."
The third finding reads as follows :
''The court further finds that payment has been
fully and completely made for the property hereinabove described, and that the possession is rightful·
and valid. ''
Outside of the value of the property being found to
be $200.00, finding No. 2 is in reality a conclusion of law.
If there were sufficient findings the court might conclude
that the defendants are the owners and therefore entitled
to possession, or the court might conclude that the defendants were entitled to possession even though not the own-_
~rs. But where are there any findings in these cases from
which the court might conclude ownership in the defendants, or any findings as· to how the plaintiffs, stipulated
to have been the owners of the property, were divested of
or passed title~ The only statement in the so-called findings that might possibly support the conclusions, is finding No. 2 "that payment has been fully and completely
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made for the property hereinabove described.''
'Yords in that finding ''and that the

po~session

The

is right-

ful and Yalid'' state a conclusion of law. We submit that
a mere finding that payment has been fully and completely made for the property, wiht nothing further to
show· by 'vhom paid, when, amount, and particularly to
"""hom, and 'vithout a finding whether paid for and on account of purchase price, or for and on account of lease
rentals, forms no basis whatever for the conclusion that
the defendants are the owners of the property. For instance, payment made to one not the owner and having
no right to sell, does not vest title to property in the person making payment. Payment made to apply on rental
does not constitute payment on the purchase price. Payrnent of money by defendants to Ervin C: Lay, who had
no legal right to sell and who had no title to the property
'IVO'ltld not vest title in the defendants.
It canot be determined from the findings on what
theory or on what facts the court predicates its conclusions of law and decr~es - whether on the fact that Lay
had some agreement or arrangement as a modification to
the franchise agreement; whether on the fact that for
some reason or another the defendants were not bound
by thir written rental agreement, acknowledging the tanks
and appurtenances were leased property; or whether on
the fact that the sales slip with the printed words thereon
''sold to'' constituted a bill of sale and modification of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
the written agreements.
From the evidence, both oral and documentary, it is
clear that it was never intended the storage tanks and
appurtenances or fittings should be sold to Lay, but it
'\\ras intended such tanks and equipment would remain the
property of plaintiffs who would service the same by
keeping in repair, painted, etc., and who would have the
sole right to refill, either by themselves or through their
dealer, with their own liquified gas. The franchise is
clear on this proposition and should be conclusive as between the plaintiffs and their dealer Lay. When the defendants made payments to Lay, they knew such storage
tanks and equipment were,.. leased, because they were expressly so advised by plaintiffs and agreed that the
I
''lease'' consideration would be a stipulated figure ae
rental, as shown in their signed agreements, exhibits 2
and 6. The only business arrangement ever had or even
discussed between plaintiffs and !.Jay was. the franchise
arrangement reduced to writing, (Ex. 1); (Tr. 7-8).
The testimony of Lay is conclusive that the tanks
were never sold to him, that title never passed to him and
that he was not justified in even believing that title
passed to him. The evidence shows that as long as Lay
was acting as plaintiffs' dealer he never made a claim
to the ownership of the tanks, but when he cancelled
the franchise agreement and went into the- liquid gas business as their competitor, he then conceived the idea of
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claiming the tanks 'vere sold to him, and by him to the
defendants, so the plaintiffs could not continue to service the tanks and sell the refills. It is quite obvious that
the only fact upon which Lay contends the tanks were
purchased outright and not leased is because of one sales
slip or _memorandum under which a charge was made to
him by plaintiffs, and because of one statement submitted to him by plaintiffs.
An examination of Lay's testimony shows that he
relies entirely on this sales slip or momerandum, and
one statement, and disregards entirely his franchise
agreement, and the understandings and dealings had with
plaintiffs. Exhibit H was written by Lay and given to
Johnson and shows a credit or payment of $556.83, with
a charge of $100.00 for a steam table, and a balance of
$400.00 on the ~ccount. There is nothing on this slip to
show whether the credit "on gas job" was credit for payment of. a rental on tank or purchase of merchandise, or
both. Johnson testified that when he made the payment
of $556.83 it was a down payment which included the tank
and other merchandise such as- hea.ting panels, etc. ( Tr.
46).

Lay did not testify to any specific conversation or
arrangement of any kind wherein he purchased these
tanks or wherein the tanks were delivered to him other
'
than under
lease as set forth in the franchise, and in line
\vith the understanding between the parties and their in-
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tentions.

He did not even testify to any specific busi-

ness arrangement with the defendants under which he
''sold'' the tanks to them, nor do they testify to any arrangement either with plaintiffs or with Lay under which
they were to acquire the title to the tanks rather than
lease the same as provided in Exhibits 2 and 6. The evidence upon which Lay must rely to show a purchase of
the tanks from plaintiff is based on Exhibit A. Concerning that exhibit Lay states ''it is a receipt for the payment of two 320 g~llon tanks which I received from Mr.
LaFrentz'' (Tr. 54). One of the two. tanks mentioned
in Exhibit A is the tank involved in the Johnson case.
The slip or memo (called by Lay a receipt) is on a printed
sales slip wherein the "\\7 ords ''sold to'' are printed. The
slip described the two tanks with a charge of $300 and
written thereon are the words ''paid by check No. 0296/12/47. '' If the charge, under the terms of the franchise, was a rental charge, then the rental charge was
paid, and the statement "paid by check" does not imply
the purchase price of the tanks was paid, or that the mere
fact of payment changes a rental charge to a purchase
price payment. Lay seems to contend that only because
of Exhibit A, and irrespective of and contrary to any and
all other agreements, intentions. and understandings, the
tanks were sold to and paid for by him. Exhibit A was
admitted in evidence, but its· admission was limited to the
purpose of showing payment of $300.00 and ~ot to be con-
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sidered in and of itself as a document transferring title
(Tr. 55-6-7).
As to the 500 gallon tank, Lay relies entirely on Exhibit "B" to show his claimed title. This exhibit shows
a statement of various charges - including $250.00 as the
charge for each of two 500 gallon tanks, one of which is
the tank involved in the Blake ·suit. The statement does
not attempt to segregate rental charges for leased tanks
and cylinders from charges for merchandise and appliances being sold outright. ~Just how such a statement'can
be construed as a bill of sale or how it can be construed
to modify the franchise agreement and convert a rental
into a sale, we cannot understand. Nothing in the findings indicates the trial court's views. Exhibit "0" is
a check from Lay to plaintiffs dated July 23rd, 1947, for
$250.63 on which was written ''payment in full for all
I.JaFrentz accounts.'' Those words .were scratched out
and we assume were so scratched before the check was
cashed. However, assuming such words remained, this
check only shows payment of the LaFrentz ''accounts''
'vhich would include, of course, any moneys due for merchandise and appliances sold ou.tright and for any rental
charges due for leased merchandise. Lay did not testify
that in making such final payment he and plaintiffs had
any agreement or understanding that it paid for the purchase price and not the lease-rental price for storage
tanks. (See Tr. 61-2). He admitted freely that the check
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represented articles other and in addition to the tanks)
that the check balanced the account irrespective of whether it was for tanks or appliances. He also admitted that
when plaintifs sent him a statement it included charges
for tanks and cylinders, and those charges were intermingled in tht statement with charges for appliances and
articles being sold to him for resale to his customers. He
admitted that a check given by him in payment would include payment for appliances as well as charges for tanks
and cylinders (Tr. 64).
It is significant that when the franchise was signed
on Dec. 7th, 1946, as testified to by plaintiffs, or on Dec.
9th, 1946, as testified to by Lay, the first statement or invoice given to Lay thereafter on Dec. 9th, 1946, contained
· a rental charge of $1500.00 for 100 cylinders, an,d an express writing thereon to the effect that these cylinders
remain the property of plaintiffs, which statement was
signed by I.Jay (Ex. 8). These cylinders are small storage tanks holding 100 lbs. for gas when full, and are installed mostly for household use. The 320 gallon and 500
gallon tanks serve the same purp·ose, but hold more gas
and are used by business houses and for commercial use,
such as cafes, etc. It· appears that plaintiffs adopted
the precaution of expressly writing into that first invoice
the statement showing that title remained in them, notwithstanding the franchise also so provided. After that
it was not deemed necessary. vVhen Lay was on the
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stand under cross-examination and before he was shown
Exhibit 8 he testified as follows:

Q. Now, did you have any arrangement with the
LaFrentz Company 'vhether or not your method
of acquiring possession and taking over tanks,
such as this 500 gallon tank and the 320 gallon
tank, was different from taking over the cylinr
ders J?
A. There was nothing said.

Q. In other-· word~, do I understand that the arrangement or deal, wh~tever it was between you
and the LaFrentz people was the same concerning any equipment that was to be installed or
refilled whether it be these 100 pound cylinders
or these larger tanks~
A. So far as I knew there was no difference.

Q.· And whatever your deal was concerning 100
pound cylinders would be the same type of deal
and arrangement concerning other equipment,
and these larger tanks which were to be installed
for customers' use and to be refilled when
empty.
A. That's right.

(Tr. 66-67).

There is no evidence in the record that the franchise
agreement was changed or modified, either orally or by
writing. In fact, no change or modification was -even
discussed. .There is no evidence in the record that the
tanks in question or any tanks were delivered to Lay under any arrangement or agreement other than under the
franchise agreement, unless it is held that the printed
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•

words·" sold to·" on the slip or the inclusion of a lease
rental charge on a statement constituted a change or modification of the previous arrangement, understanding,
contract and intention. Attention is specifically called to
the fact that there were neither discussions respecting,
negotiations for, or agreements to make such change. ·The
memorandum or slip containing the words "sold to" concerns only the 320 gallon tank. The claim for the 500
gallon tank is based on Exhibit B which is merely a statement showing a charge,. but without expressly stating
that the charge is for rental. No formal bill of sale or
other writings, or oral statements, were given or made by
plaintiffs to Lay, nor is it even claimed that any writings
other than the exhibits mentioned were entered into or
passed between the parties.
It is quite obvious that had Mrs. LaFrentz written
on the slip or on the statement the same notation as on
the original invoice for the 100 cylinders, or had struck
a pen through the words ''sold to'' on the slip, or had
billed the 500 gallon tank on a statement separate from
any other items, Lay would never have thought to claim
he had ''purchased'' the tanks. But because she did not
mistrust !.Jay and assumed that ordinary business dealings between them would be in accordance with previous
understanding, arrangement and intention, she did not
take every precaution "to characterize each transaction
separately and brand each transaction for what it was,
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- as a sale or a lease rental. In the light of Exhibits. 2
and 6 signed by the defendants acknowledging that the
tanks were leased or rented, it is apparent that the de·fendants would never have claimed title to the tanks ·excepting for the claim of Lay in. the first instance and to
assist Lay in claiming the right to refill th_e tanks with
his own liquid gas.
Plaintiffs call attention that by the execution of the
LaFrentz Legas Combination Agreement (Exhibits 2
and 6) defendants admitted that title to said tanks were in
plaintiffs. While the defendants must claim title through
Lay or not at all, and that payments made to Lay, no matter what the agreement between them and I~ay, _would not
be binding on these plaintiffs, nevertheless it is significant that they made their payments to Lay after admitting title to be in plaintiffs by the execution of. the combination agreements. If defendants seek to avoid the effect
of these agreements, has their testimony and evidence met
the degree of proof required~ We think not.
II.
Title to the personal property did not pass to Lay
merely because of a sales slip containi~g the words "sold
to'' nor because of lease charges being included in a certain ''statement,'' when the, agreement, understanding
and intention of the parties was that the personal propPrty should bP leased and title remain in the plaintiffs.
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And of course, unless Lay got title, the defendants through
Lay could get no title.
Under all the circumstances, the facts simmer down
to this : By the facts hereinbefore set forth and not repeated here it appears beyond question or argument that
plaintiffs were the owners of the tanks. prior to deli'very
to Lay; that the tanks were delivered to Lay under the
leasehold provisions of the franchise agreement and in
,accordance with the acknowledged understanding of the
parties that title remained in the plaintiffs; that Lay so
understood that the tanks for stor~ge, distinguished from
appliances for resale, were under title-retaining features; that the first lot of tanks ( 100 100-lb. tanks) were
delivered under express stipulation respecting the title·retaining. features (Exhibit No. 8) and Lay testi~ied
flatly that nothing was said respecting any change of arrangement, intention or understanding, that so far as he
knew no different arrangement "\Vas made or contemplated, and that the larger tanks such as the two tanks involved in these cases were delivered under exactly the
same deal as the delivery of the 100 smaller tanks (Trans.
66-67) about which there was and is absolutely no question.
The flat question presented ·is this : Did the mere
billing of one tank on a sales slip containing the printed
·form words ''sold to'' change the transaction between
the parties .and constitute a bill of sale and pass title, and
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did the mere inclusion of the billing of the second tank
on a statement "rith other items similarly constitute a bill
of sale and pass title~ And respecting the tank mentioned
on the statement, 'vhere the statement does not specify
"Thether the items are for resale or under lease or rental
and indicates only the articles an~ amounts due, some
being for resale and others for lease, does the inclusion of
both classes ·of articles in one statement result in said
statement constituting a bill of sale to all~
Under all the circumstances, and with. common and
ordinary interpretation of business dealings, was this
sufficient to change. the transactions and contracts between the parties~ Plaintiffs submit that this leads to a
result illogical from either a factual or legal viewpoint.
From a factual viewpoint and disregarding the law, there
is indicated no intention by the plaintiffs or Lay to abrogate or change the agreements and understandings and
intentions previously exhibited. On the contrary, Lay
himself admits that there was no change of arrangement.
From a legal viewpoint, it is submitted that there was no
modification of the original agreement or understanding
by which Lay was bound.
It is true, without question, that a written or an oral
contract can be subsequently modified orally. Parker v.
Weber County Irri. District, 65 Utah 354, 236 Pac. 1105.
But to constitute a modification the n1inds of the· parties
must meet, and while the fact of agreement may be implied
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. from a course of conduct, it is not sufficient even to show
an ambiguous course of dealing from which one party
might reasonably infer that the original contract was still
in force, and the other party infer that it had been
changed. See 17 C. J. S. Contracts, Sec. 375. In this case
there was no meeting of the minds respecting a modification of the previous agreement and understanding, and
there was no course of conduct from which Lay could
imply a change of agreement. To the contrary, he readily
admitted there was no such change. (Trans. 66-67). While
the circumstances do not even show an ambiguous course
of dealing, the most that can be said for the situation is
that the sales slip and the statement, upon which Lay
relies, leads to an ambiguity but La.y could not reasonably
infer that there was any change.
ThP new or modified agreement must have all the
requisites of a valid and enforceable contract, and mere
indefinite expressions are not sufficient. 17 C. J. S.
Contracts Sec. 37 4. Plaintiffs submit that there is no
meeting of minds respecting the tanks and that they did
not intend to pass title merely because they billed_ the
lease rental consideration for the tanks on a business
sales slip, and merely because they included a leasehold
charge in a statement.
Even assuming that Lay so understood the effect of
the statement and sales slip, which cannot be the effect
of the evidence and particularly his own admissions, still
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it \Vould take something more definite, by mutual assent
or understanding, to accomplish the result contended for
by the defendants.
But if the defendants, on the other hand, contend that
the above principles do not apply, and contend that the
sales slip and statement constitute a part of the entire
transaction, rather than a modification, then plaintiffs
point out that it is a fundamental rule of law that where
there are ~everal separate instruments making up a contract, or where several documents refer to the same transaction, all of the several instruments or documents must
be·construed together and with reference to each other.
To have two or more writings construed together it is not necessary that one of them should
refer to the other in express terms. If two or more
writings are executed between the same parties and
concerning the same subject matter, they may be
construed together as a part of the same transaction, at least in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Thus a note and the contract under which
it was made; a land contract. and a deed; * * * · a
will, deed and contract; different written contracts
and checks may in each case be construed together.
Page on Contracts, 2nd Ed. Vol. 4, S~ec. 2046, at
pages 3538-9.
If two contracts are not executed at the same
time, but refer to the same subject-matter, and on
their face show that they were executed each as a
means of carrying out the same intent as the other~
they should be construed together. Page · 3539,
Page on Contracts, 2nd ~Jd. Vol. 4, Sec. 2046.
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A contract and deed which is given in performance of such contract may be construed together,
although they are executed several months apart.
Warrants which are issued by a public board in payment for work labor and materials under a contractmay be considered in connection with such contract
in order to ascertain its meaning. A contract between A and B by which A agrees to purchase automobiles and- B agrees .to appoint A as B 's sales
agent, is to be construed in connection with a bill
of sale given as a pa:r:t of the same transaction.
- (See Wilcox vs. Badger llotor Car Co., 99 Nebr.189,
155 N. W. 891. Pages on Contracts;- pages 3541 and
3542).
Where a contract consists of several different
instruments each document will be read and construed with reference to the others, and the contract
will, if possible, be given effect as a whole. Sterling
vs. Head Camp Pac. Jurisdiction, etc., 80 Pac. 1110,
28 Utah 526.
This Court surely cannot construe the sales slip and
the statement as instruments passing title, in view of the
franchise agreement and the admitted understanding of
Lay (Trans. 66-67). The words ''sold to'' printed on a
'sales stlip (Exhibit H) of a type commonly us.ed by many
- business is too general in language to modify or abrogate
the specific provisions of the franchise agreement; and,
the incluRion of the leasehold rental on the statement (Exhibit B) has even less meaning, the statement purporting
only to show an- amount due from Lay to plaintiffs by
reason of the items containing in the statement, and not
intending nor purporting to show the character of the
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transactions referred to. Plaintiffs contend that under
the la";r and the numerous authorities such printed words
''sold to'' on the sales slip do not and cannot change the
W'"ritten franchise agreement and make a sale of what is
otherwise agreed shall be a rental. In other words, these
general printed "\Vords on the sales slip do not modify an
express agreement, and Lay testified without equivocation that there was no change of understanding.
If an ambiguity exists respecting the meaning and
intention of the sales slip, reference then must be made
to all the surrounding circumstances, and in such event
the result will be exactly the same as hereinbefore indicated.
It may be well to mention that a holding that the two
tanks involved in these actions before this Court belong
to the plaintiffs will resuJt in no loss or injury to the re-·
spective defendants. They receive exactly what was contemplated, i. e., the right to the use of the tanks in accordance with standard business practiee, pertaining to
the use of liquified gas, and in accordance with the combi-·
nation agreements (Exhibits 2 and 6) they signed respectively in .June of 1947 and February of 1947. Further
attention may be called to the fact that none of the defendants were misled by the sales slip or the statement~
for there is no evidence that any of the defendants saw or
kne'v of either of said documents. While it would be immaterial, for defendants could get no title from Lay if
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title did not pass from plaintiffs to Lay, plaintiffs feel it
well to point out that they will not be injured by a holding of this Court favorable to the plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs and appellants respectfully submit that the
decrees he ret of ore entered by the trial court in these two
actions should be set aside, with directions to the trial
court to recast its findings of fact and conclusions of law
and to enter judgments in favor of plaintiffs as prayed
for in their complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINE, WILSON AND CLINE,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
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